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The Materiality Standard in Denaturalization
Cases: Concealment by Naturalized Citizen
of Service as Nazi Death Camp Guard
United States v. Fedorenko
597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980)
The United States commenced a denaturalization proceeding,
1
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), 2 against Feodor Fedorenko, a Ukrai-
nian 3 who emmigrated to the United States in 1949' and was
naturalized in 1970.' Therein, the Government alleged that the de-
fendant had illegally procured his United States citizenship by failing
to disclose on his application for Immigration Visa and Alien Registra-
tion that he had served as a guard in a Nazi death camp during
World War II. The Government also alleged that the defendant was
ineligible for admission to the United States under the Displaced
1. 597 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1979).
2. Id. at 948. Fedorenko was admitted under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,
62 Stat. 1009 (1948). During the two fiscal years following the passage of this Act, up
to 202,000 eligible European refugees driven from their homelands during World
War II would be permitted to emigrate to the United States without regard to the
immigration quota limitations for those years. Id. at 1010.
3. Id. at 948. Fedorenko's petition for naturalization was granted by the
Superior Court of New Haven County, Connecticut, on April 23, 1970. See Brief for
Appellant, United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd and
remanded, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980). Oral
argument before the Supreme Court began on October 15, 1980. The Government's
case was argued by United States Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, who termed
the issuer of the case "crucial" to American immigration and naturalization policy.
Miami Herald, Oct. 16, 1980, at 32, col. 1.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) provides in part:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys . . . upon affidavit
showing good cause therefore, to institute proceedings ... for the purpose
of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizen-
ship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such
order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were pro-
cured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresenta-
tion,...,
For a detailed outline of United States Immigration Laws, see H.R. REP. No. 1137,
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653-82.
6. 455 F. Supp. at 897. The Government likewise alleged this omission with
respect to Fedorenko's Application to File Petition for Naturalization. Id. at 898.
Fedorenko was a draftee in the Red Army when he was captured by the Germans,
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Persons Act of 1948, and the immigration laws, orders, and regula-
tions issued thereunder, because of his participation in the commis-
sion of crimes and atrocities against civilians at the death camp. 7 The
Government's final allegation was that the defendant lacked the good
moral character necessary to become a citizen, both by virtue of his
failure to reveal facts concerning his guard service and by his com-
mission of atrocities at the death camp. 8  The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, in concluding that the
Government had failed to prove by clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
ing evidence ' both that the defendant committed the atrocities at the
death camp and that be lacked the good moral character necessary to
become an American citizen, found that the defendant had lawfully
entered the United States."' Equitable and mitigating cir-
cumstances 1 weighing in the defendant's favor further supported the
district court's conclusion. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, held, reversed and remanded: The Government had proven
by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the defendant
was guilty of concealing material facts since disclosure of these facts
7. Id. at 897. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, supra note 2 [§§ 2b-2c],
defines "eligible displaced person" largely by reference to the definition of "refugee
or displaced person" found in Annex I of the Constitution of the International Re-
fugee Organization, open for signature December 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, which
states that the following persons do not qualify for displaced persons status:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of coun-
tries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of
the second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
8. 455 F. Supp. at 898. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, supra, note 2, § 2(c)
requires that an "eligible displaced person" be qualified under the immigration laws
for admission into the United States for permanent residence. One such qualification
is good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1964).
9. The burden of proof in denaturalization cases has been clearly stated by the
Supreme Court in Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 663 (1958), as follows:
Where citizenship is at stake the Government carries the heavy bur-
den of proving its case by "'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence
which does not leave 'the issue in doubt' . . . ." Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 158. Especially is this so when the attack is made long
after the time when the certificate of citizenship was granted and the citizen
has meanwhile met his obligations and has committed no act of lawlessness."
Id. at 122-23.
455 F. Supp. at 898.
10. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 920.
11. See generally, United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Snpp. 893, at 896 and
918-20.
NOTE
would have led the Government to make an inquiry that might have
uncovered other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
This Note will provide an in-depth analysis of the Fedorenko
case, beginning with a synopsis of the lower court's decision, followed
by an historical survey of the applicable law. Thereafter will follow an
examination of the Fifth Circuit's ratio decidendi along with com-
ments relevant to this case and to this particular area of the law.
The district court proceeding balanced the evidence offered by
the Government against the defenses asserted by Fedorenko. 12 The
Government called six eye-witnesses who had been working prisoners
at Treblinka but had escaped during an uprising in 1943. The trial
court, however, rejected their in-court identifications of the defen-
dant for two reasons. First, the court concluded that the photo spread
used prior to trial was impermissibly suggestive and likely to result in
misidentification. 13 Secondly, "[t]he [district] court was convinced
that the witnesses were discussing the trial among themselves, at
least; and at worst someone was coaching them." 14 In addition, the
court found the Government's expert witness' testimony to be consis-
tently inaccurate.15 As to whether Fedorenko could have made some
feasible choice other than serving as a guard at Treblinka, the court
found the evidence to establish that he had served involuntarily as a
guard at the death camp. 1 6
The district court concluded that the defendant had lawfully en-
tered the United States, 1 7 in spite of misrepresentations he made in
applying for citizenship.' 8 In addition, equitable consideration in the
defendant's favor were found to outweigh all others, thus requiring
the same result. 19
12. Specifically, "Defendant . . contends that he was not a guard voluntarily but
he was forced to be one as a prisoner of war of Nazi Germany and denies committing
any atrocities at Treblinka [the death camp] or elsewhere." 455 F. Supp. at 895-96.
13. Id. at 906. In addition, the court stated that this tainted the testimonial iden-
tification of defendant. Id.
14. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 907.
15. id. at 904, 912.
16. Id. at 914. "It is important to bear in mind that no documentary evidence
whatsoever was introduced by the Government or defendant as to the duties or con-
duct of Defendant at Treblinka." Id. at 902.
17. Id. at 916.
18. The court found these misrepresentations to be immaterial, and therefore not
to warrant denial of citizenship, because the facts suppressed, if disclosed, would not
have warranted denial of citizenship. Id.
19. Id. at 918-21. See also Letter No. 107 from the Dept. of Justice Circular
which states in part: "If however, many years have elapsed since the judgment of
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I. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
"Early in this century Congressional concerns in the area of im-
migration law focused on the economic and social problems created
by an influx of immigrants."20 "The Immigration and Naturalization
Act of 1906 instituted major procedural reforms in the administration
of the laws in an effort to curb the widespread abuses occurring at
that time." 2 1 There was, however, no statutory ground for deporting
aliens who had secured their entry into the United States by fraudu-
lent means until the passage of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.22
Section 10 of that Act provides: "[AIny person who shall willfully
make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission into
the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not
be admissible into the United States." 23  The basis of this legislation
was fear of communist infiltration. 24 The language of Section 10,
however, proved to be over-encompassing, for it extended to many
refugees who would have been admissible without fraud, but who had
made fraudulent statements out of fear of repatriation to their native
communist-dominated homelands. 25
In an effort to remedy this over-reaching effect of the Displaced
Persons Act, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 26 This Act pro-
vides relief for aliens, otherwise deportable for the perpetration of
fraud on their naturalization applications, where the fact concealed is
naturalization was .. .procured, and the party has since conducted himself as a good
citizen and possesses the necessary qualifications for citizenship, cancellation proceed-
ings should not, as a rule, be instituted." Dept. of Justice Circular Letter No. 107,
September 20, 1909, reprinted in Immigration and Naturalization Service Handbook
6508 and Roach, Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1951, 13 U. Prrr. L. REv. 276, 304
(1952).
20. 455 F. Supp. at 918; see generally [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
1653-82.
21. 455 F. Supp. at 918; see also C. Gordon and H. Rosenfield, Immigration
Law and Procedure, §§ 20.1, 20.10-.11 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Gordon and
Rosenfield].
22. Note, Aliens Fraudulently Entering the United States and Establishing Familial
Relationships-The Scope of § 241(f) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(f), 18 How. L.J. 761, 768 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note].
23. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1948).
24. S. Rep. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., (1948); 94 Cong. Rec. 6446-47 (1948);
see also Note, Note 22 supra, and Gordon & Rosenfield, note 21 supra.
25. Petition for Naturalization of Iwanenko, 145 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ill. 1956)
(such misrepresentation held to be immaterial and did not require denial of petition
for naturalization); see also Cunningham, Deportation Based Upon Fraudulent Entry:
A Limitation of the Waiver Provision, 21 Loy. L. REv. 1003 (Fall 1975), and Note,
note 22 supra.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1964).
NOTE
considered to be immaterial. Under section 1451(a), the fraudulent
concealment itself is not determinative to whether the alien is subject
to denaturalization. Rather, the materiality of the concealed facts is
the decisive factor. Section 1451, however, fails to define "material
fact" and, as a result of this omission, lower federal courts have
applied its provisions inconsistently. 2
7
In Chaunt v. United States,28 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the question of the materiality of the facts concealed by the
petitioner on his naturalization application. Reasoning that complete
honesty on the petitioner's part is crucial to the naturalization proce-
dure and to the privileges it bestows, 29 the Court stated: "Suppressed
or concealed facts, if known, might in and of themselves justify denial
of citizenship. Or disclosure of the true facts might have led to the
discovery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship." 30
After stressing the heavy burden of proof placed on the Government
in denaturalization actions, 3 1 the Court stated,
We only conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the
Government has failed to show by 'clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing' evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known,
would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclo-
sure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to
the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
3 2
27. See generally United States v. Kessler, 213 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1954), United
States ex rel Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1951), United States v.
Galato, 171 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1959), United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp.
169 (D. Md. 1957), United States v. Marsilis, 142 F Supp. 697 (W.D. Mich, 1956),
United States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Snpp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 216
(9th Cir. 1956).
28. 364 U.S. 350 (1960). Eleven years before the petitioner was naturalized, he
was arrested on three separate occasions for distributing handbills, for violating park
regulations by making an oration, and for breach of the peace. Id. at 352. The Gov-
ernment sought to denaturalize petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) on the ground
that he had procured his naturalization by fraudulently concealing these arrests on his
naturalization application. Id. at 351.
29. Id. at 352. See generally note 103 infra.
30. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1960).
31. "[I]n view of the grave consequences to the citizen, naturalization decrees are
not lightly to be set aside-the evidence must indeed be 'clear, unequivocal, and
convincing' and not leave 'the issue . . . in doubt.'" Id. at 353 [citing Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) and Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 670 (1944)].
32. Id. at 355. It is important to note that the Court partially based its conclusion
on the fact that petitioner's disclosure of his affiliation with the International Workers'
Order, a communist-affiliated organization, had failed to prompt further investigation
by immigration officials and any disclosure regarding petitioner's arrests would have
been even less likely to prompt an investigation. Id.
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The inherent ambiguity of the language of Chaunt has led to
much dispute over the materiality standard set forth therein. Some
courts have interpreted the standard to require that the concealed
facts warrant denial of citizenship in order to be considered mate-
rial. 33
In contrast to this interpretation is the view that Chaunt sets
forth a two-phase test for determining whether a concealed fact is
material. Under this two-phase interpretation, a fact is material either
if it would have warranted denial of citizenship or if its disclosure
might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the
discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.3 4  The lan-
guage of the Chaunt decision, later United States Supreme Court
decisions, 3 and later lower court opinions 36 appear to support both
the one-phase and the two-phase interpretations of Chaunt.
Advocates of the one-phase analysis 7 argue that the Supreme
Court in Chaunt was merely enunciating reasons as to why honesty is
essential in the naturalization process when it stated: "Suppressed or
concealed facts, if known, might in and of themselves justify denial of
citizenship. Or disclosure of the true facts might have led to the dis-
covery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship."' 38
There is no reference to "materiality" either prior to or immediately
after this statement by the Court.3 9 Materiality, as defined in the
second half of the two-phase interpretation, does not appear until two
pages later in the Court's opinion: "In this case, however, we are
asked [by the Government] to base materiality on the tenuous line of
33. United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962) (concealment of alien's
true identity held not to be concealment of a material fact where disclosure thereof
would not have warranted denial of naturalization); La Madrid-Peraza v, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974) (overstatement of wages
held not to be concealment of a material fact where true wages would not result in
denial of alien's labor certificate); United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1964)
(concealment of entry to United States as stowavay, which fact would have barred
naturalization of defendant held to be concealment of a material fact).
34. Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961) (concealment of
Communist Party membership which foreclosed further inquiry held to be conceal-
ment of a material fact); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.) cert. denied
375 U.S. 833 (1963) (concealment of prior arrests which foreclosed avenue of inquiry
by immigration officials held to be concealment of material facts); Kassab v. immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966) (concealment of marital
status which might have led to further action held to be concealment of material
fact).
35. See note 42 and note 45, infra.
36. Compare cases cited in note 33 supra, with cases cited in note 34 supra.
37. Cases cited in note 33 supra.
38. 364 U.S. at 352-53.
39. Id.
NOTE
investigation that might have led from the arrests to the alleged
communistic affiliations...." 4 0  The Court denied the Government's
request. The Court further limited and qualified its conclusion with
the words, "'[O]nly in the circumstances of this case..... .41 thus
seeming to blunt the argument of those who see the case as mandat-
ing a two-step test.
Within one year after Chaunt was decided, the United States
Supreme Court held, in Costello v. United States,42 that concealment
of the fact that bootlegging was the true occupation of the defendant,
who was naturalized during prohibition, "would support the conclu-
sion that he was an applicant who had suppressed or concealed facts
[which] if known, might in and of themselves justify denial of citizen-
ship. '" 4 3 The Court made no mention whatsoever of whether disclo-
sure of this same fact might have been useful in an investigation pos-
sibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citi-
zenship. The fact of such an omission, so soon after the Chaunt deci-
sion, has led some courts to conclude that concealment of facts, the
disclosure of which might be useful in a further investigation, was not
intended by the Court to be a bona fide standard of materiality.
44
Five years later, in Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,4 5 the United States Supreme Court held that "no deportation
order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation
are true. '4 The Court, in reaching its decision, analogized de-
naturalization cases to deportation cases. 47 Due to the "immediate
hardship" suffered by the alien as a result of either denaturalization
or deportation, the Court found the burden of proof required in de-
40. 364 U.S. at 354-55. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(c) (providing aliens af-
filiated with the Communist Party are ineligible to receive visas and are inadmissible
into the United States), the fact that petitioner was affiliated with the communist
party would have warranted denial of admission into the United States.
41. Id. at 355.
42. 365 U.S. 265 (1961). The Government sought to denaturalize the defendant
under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), supra note 5.
43. 365 U.S. at 272 (citing Chaunt).
44. See generally cases cited in note 33 supra.
45. 385 U.S. 276 (1966). Here, the Government instituted deportation proceed-
ings under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(12) (finding aliens who engage in prostitution in the
United States are excluded from admission and deportable) against the petitioner on
the grounds that she had engaged in prostitution after entry.
46. Id. at 286.
47. Id.
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naturalization actions, that of "clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence," to be equally applicable in deportation actions. 48
Considering the relatively short space of time which elapsed be-
tween the Chaunt and Woodby decisions coupled with the analogy
the Supreme Court drew between deportation and denaturalization
proceedings, 49 the requirement of proving true the grounds for de-
portation may be seen to likewise extend to denaturalization cases. 50
Any less exacting standard for denaturalization proceedings (i.e., the
two-phase interpretation), in light of their resemblance to deportation
proceedings, would be incongruous with the Supreme Court's holding
in Woodby.
Certain circuit courts of appeals have adopted this one-phase in-
terpretation of the Chaunt materiality standard in holding that mate-
rial facts are only those which, had they been disclosed, would have
warranted denial of citizenship. 5 ' In United States v. Rossi, 52 the
Ninth Circuit held that proof of Rossi's intentional misrepresentation
alone was not enough to divest him of citizenship.
The materiality of his misrepresentation may be determined
by the bearing it had upon his right to enter this country; if per-
mission rested upon the truth of the fact represented and he could
not have secured a visa as Cesare Rossi, a native of Italy, then the
fact was material -otherwise it was irrelevant. Stated another way,
a fact suppressed or misstated is not material to an alien's entry
unless it is one which, if known, would have justified a refusal to
issue the visa. 53
Again, in 1974, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its interpretation as set
forth in Chaunt.5 4
In Chaunt v. United States, . . . the Supreme Court held that
in order to denaturalize a citizen on the basis of a misrepresenta-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In Woodby there was no mention of any two-phase materiality standard as set
forth in Chaunt. The Court failed to consider whether disclosure of the concealed
facts might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of
other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
51. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
52. 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962). In Rossi, the defendant concealed his true
identity to avoid exclusion under the immigration quotas then in effect.
53. 299 F.2d at 652-53.
54. La Madrid-Peraza v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 492 F.2d 1297
(9th Cir. 1974). The court held that petitioner was not deportable because she had
overstated her prospective wages on her application for a labor certificate, absent
evidence showing that the amount she was paid was below the prevailing wage rate
for American workers similarly situated.
NOTE
tion or concealment of facts in his naturalization petition, the Gov-
ernment must prove that if the truth had been disclosed it would
have warranted denial of citizenship. In United States v. Rossi, . . .
we followed the Supreme Court's rationale in Chaunt, and held
that a fact suppressed or misstated is not material to an alien's
entry unless the truth would have justified a refusal to issue a
visa. 55
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also follows this one-phase
interpretation of the Chaunt materiality test. In United States v.
Riela,5 6 the court reasoned:
There is ample evidence in the record that answers given by the
defendant, in response to pertinent questions contained in the var-
ious documents, were knowingly false. However, this evidence,
standing along, would not satisfy the requirements as to the bur-
den of proof in the absence of further evidence that the answers
were material. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355, 81
S.Ct. 147, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960). The false answers given by the
defendant were material if they resulted in the suppression of facts
which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship.
Ibid. 57
The court concluded that the answers given by the defendant were
material facts under this standard because disclosure thereof would
have barred the naturalization of the defendant, given his obvious
failure to meet the statutory requirements.
5 8
Such widespread support for this interpretation of- the Chaunt
materiality standard is met by an equal amount of support for a two-
phase test.5 9 Advocates of the two-phase test argue that the literal
reading of Chaunt favors their interpretation. For example, the Sup-
reme Court actually numbered its conclusion, as part (1) and part
(2),60 thus indicating a two-part test for materiality. Advocates of the
two-phase interpretation claim that the absence of any mention by
the United States Supreme Court of the second phase thereof, i.e.,
55. Id. at 1298. The court noted that although Chaunt involved denaturalization,
its rationale is forceful here, where the severe remedy of deportation is at issue.
56. 337 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1964). In Riela, the Third Circuit cancelled the certifi-
cate of naturalization of defendant, who had entered the United States in violation of
the law. This concealed fact of illegal entry would have barred his naturalization.
57. Id. at 988-89.
58. Id. at 989.
59. Note 34 supra. See also Appleman, Misrepresentation in Immigration Law:
Materiality 22 FED. B.J. 267 (1962).
60. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
where disclosure might have been useful in an investigation, in Cos-
tello and Woodby 6 ' is explained by the very framework of the two-
phase test. The either-or form would indicate that once the first
phase is met, materiality is established and there is no reason to ad-
dress the second.
In Langhamnier v. Hamilton,62 the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected appellant's argument that a misrepresentation was not
material unless the alien would definitely have been excluded on pre-
sentation of the actual facts. Citing Chaunt, the court stated: "There
the Court indicated that the facts concealed would be regarded as
material if either they would have warranted denial of citizenship or
their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly
leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizen-
ship." 6" The court found that had the defendant noted the facts of
his Communist party membership, "the resultant inquiry - fore-
closed by his lack of such a notation - would most assuredly have
unearthed facts warranting his exclusion, regardless of the ultimate
determination of this question when all the evidence was in." c  The
Sixth Circuit, citing both Langhammer and Chaunt, held in Kassab v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,6r5 that "[i]t is sufficient for a
finding of materiality that if the fact ...had been revealed, it might
have led to further action and the discovery of facts which would have
justified refusal of the visa." 66
In United States v. Oddo,6 7 the Second Circuit agreed with the
First and Sixth Circuits' interpretation of Chaunt. Affirming the order
to revoke appellant's citizenship, the court stated:
Failure to disclose a record of prior arrests, even though none
of those arrests by itself would be a sufficient ground for denial of
naturalization, closes to the Government an avenue of enquiry
61. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Woodby v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
62. 295 F.2d 642 (1961). The First Circuit affirmed the final order of deporta-
tion, where the alien had concealed facts regarding his Communist Party member-
ship and wide range of activities with respect thereto.
63. Id. at 648.
64. Id.
65, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cii,. 1966). Kassab involved review of deportation orders
issued on grounds that the alien misrepresented the fact that he was married to an
American citizen.
66. Id. at 807.
67. 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1963). The defendant therein a naturalized citizen, had
concealed facts that he was arrested for burglary in 1927, disorderly conduct in 1928
and 1929, homicide in 1930, vagrancy in 1931, assault and robbery in 1931, and
violation of an (illegal) occupation statute in 1931.
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which might conceivably lead to collateral information of greater
relevance. .. . As the Court said in Chaunt, "An arrest, though by
no means probative of any guilt or wrongdoing, is sufficiently sig-
nificant as an episode in a man's life that it may often be material
at least to further enquiry." 364 U.S. at 354, 81 S.Ct. at 150. Oddo
denied the Government the opportunity to make that enquiry.68
Oddo's failure to disclose his record of prior arrests denied the Gov-
ernment the opportunity to further inquire into his background. This
failure warranted the court's finding that he had concealed a material
fact.
Amid this controversy regarding the proper interpretation of
Chaunt, United States v. Fedorenko reached the Fifth Circuit on ap-
peal from the District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
II. THE FEDORENKO OPINION
The four major areas of inquiry addressed by the court in the
instant case were as follows: (1) the statutory provisions applicable in
this denaturalization action; (2) the proper interpretation of the mate-
riality standard as set forth in Chaunt; 9 (3) the proper weight to be
afforded the expert testimony taken before the district court; and (4)
the district court's alternative holding that equitable considerations
required judgment for the defendant. 70  The circuit court initially
examined the statutory provisions applicable in denaturalization pro-
ceedings. Section 1451(a) provides for denaturalization where "such
order (visa) and certificate of naturalization 7 1 were procured illegally
or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful mis-
representation."
For the Government to have properly brought the action against
Fedorenko, the court found, the defendant must have either illegally
procured his admission or concealed a material fact in the admission
process. The court considered the Government's first argument, that
68. Id. at 118.
69. 364 U.S, 350.
70. The court did not address the Government's argument that it had proved that
the defendant had concealed his perpetration of war crimes at Trebhinka, since it held
that the defendant obtained his citizenship by misrepresentation. 597 F.2d at 953.
71. See the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1013, § 10: "[A]ny person
who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission into
the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible
into the United States." 597 F.2d 946, 949 note 1. Thus a certificate of naturalization
is invalid where the visa was illegally procured.
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the defendant had procured his visa by illegal means since he was not
an eligible displaced person as defined by the Displaced Persons Act
of 1948.72 The court found that the defendant had "fraudulently ob-
tained" his visa by failing to reveal, in his visa application, his where-
abouts during the war years and his concentration camp service.
73
The court did not find, however, that a fraudulently obtained visa is
one procured by illegal means and, therefore, the court held that the
Government failed to establish the claimed violation of section
1451(a). 74
The court, in analyzing the Government's claim that the defen-
dant procured his visa by concealing a material fact, sought to define
"material fact." The court rejected the materiality standards offered
by each of the parties, 75 and adopted the following standard: "We
read the second test to require only that the Government prove by
clear and convincing evidence that disclosure would have led the
Government to make an inquiry that might have uncovered other
facts warranting denial of citizenship. "76 In rejecting the standard of
materiality offered by the defendant, that of requiring the suppressed
facts to warrant denial of citizenship, the court held that the district
court's acceptance of this standard was an error of law because "t]hat
interpretation destroyed the utility of the second Chaunt test, since it
would require, as does the first Chaunt test, that the Government
prove ultimate facts warranting denial of citizenship. "77
Despite the Fifth Circuit's claim that its interpretation "comports
with the language of the Chaunt opinion,"' 7  it literally contradicts
the Chaunt language. The court's standard requires a fact to be
considered material where "disclosure would have led the Govern-
ment to make an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts war-
ranting denial of citizenship" 79 whereas, Chaunt regards a fact to be
considered material where "disclosure might have been useful in an
investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warrant-
72. Defendant was issued his visa under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 on his
sworn claim that he was an "eligible displaced person." See note 7 supra.
73. 597 F.2d at 949.
74. Id. at 950.
75. Id. at 951. The defendant offered the one-phase interpretation of the Chaunt
language, whereas the Government advocated the two-phase interpretation. See gen-
erally cases cited notes 33 and 34 supra.
76. 597 F.2d at 951.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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ing denial of citizenship."' 80 The court fails to explain this blatant
discrepancy, except perhaps in its notation, "[T]he phraseology of the
two tests adopted in Chaunt does create some ambiguity about the
meaning to be accorded the second test." 8 '
The court, in bolstering its choice of the compromising material-
ity standard, considered both the possible ramifications of the district
court's approach 8 2 and cited to support of commentators in the
field.8 3 The court rationalized its holding as an attempt to "guard the
integrity of this priceless treasure (American citizenship)." 
8 4
The Fifth Circuit's materiality standard can be interpreted as a
compromise between those standards offered by the parties. This
standard may be considered more exacting than the precise language
of Chaunt in that it requires that disclosure would have led the Gov-
ernment to conduct an inquiry as opposed to the standard where dis-
closure might have been useful in an investigation. Although the Fifth
Circuit's materiality standard may, by virtue of its exacting nature,
prevent the Government from bringing an action under section
1451(a) against certain naturalized aliens, the adoption of this new
standard did little to resolve the confusion and uncertainty surround-
ing the definition of "material fact."
Finally, the circuit court criticized the lower court's refusal to
accord conclusive weight to the expert testimony presented at the
trial. The court found that "[t]he evidence before the district court
clearly and convincingly proved that, had the defendant disclosed his
guard service, the American authorities would have conducted an in-
quiry that might have resulted in denial of a visa.' 85 The circuit
court based its conclusion on the expert testimony which indicated
that disclosure of the defendant's guard service would automatically
have resulted in denial of the visa.86 The court failed to consider
that the trial transcript also revealed that the expert witness did not
interview Fedorenko, had no knowledge as to what facts were before
the vice-consul who processed Fedorenko's application, and thus,
80. 364 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added).
81. 597 F.2d at 951.
82. "[This] ... would allow an applicant for a visa or for citizenship to lie about
his background and thereby prevent the government from investigating his fitness at
a time when be has the burden of proving eligibility .... If that were the law, an
applicant with something to hide would have everything to gain and nothing to lose
by lying under oath to the INS." Id.
83. See generally Gordon and Rosenfield, note 21 supra.
84. 597 F.2d at 952.
85. id. at 953.
86. Id. at n.7.
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could only give a "good guess" as to what action the true interviewing
officer might have taken.8 7 Further, the expert had testified that if it
could be shown that participation as a guard at a concentration camp
was involuntary, such a person might be eligible under the Displaced
Persons Act. 88 The circuit court's failure to consider these state-
ments in its examination of all the evidence as offered before the
district court, weakens the circuit court's finding of clear, unequivocal,
and convincing proof.
Finally, the circuit court found the district court's holding that
equitable considerations required judgment for the defendant to be
error as matter of law.8 9 In support of this conclusion the court
pointed to what it found to be a "crucial distinction" between a dis-
trict court's authority to grant citizenship and its authority to revoke
citizenship.90 This "crucial distinction" enunciated by the court 91
however, failed to support its finding, for it had not been determined
at the district court level that Fedorenko did not qualify for citizen-
ship, and thus, it was questionable as to whether citizenship could be
revoked at all.
III. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS
Uncertainty, ambiguity, and confusion have filled the immigra-
tion law arena since the beginning of the century, as evidenced by
the following: (1) the enactment in 1906 of immigration reform laws
which failed to provide statutory ground for deporting aliens who had
secured their entry into the United States by fraudulent means; 92 (2)
the over-encompassing nature of section 10 of the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948, providing that any misrepresentation made by an alien
for the purpose of gaining admission to the United States would re-
sult in a finding of inadmissibility;9 3 (3) the enactment in 1952 of 8
U.S.C. § 1451(a), which provides that concealment of a material fact
will result in denaturalization, but fails to define "material fact";94 (4)
87. Brief for Appellee at 34, United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1979).
88 Id.
89. 597 F.2d 953-54.
90. Id. at 954.
91. Id. "Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify for citizen-
ship, however, the district court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant
citizenship."
92. See generally notes 20-22 supra, and accompanying text.
93. See generally notes 23-25 supra, and accompanying text.
94. See generally notes 26-27 supra, and accompanying text.
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the decision in Chaunt, which also failed to specifically define "mate-
rial fact"; 95 (5) the resultant split of the circuit courts of appeal regard-
ing the proper interpretation of Chaunt's materiality test;9" and (6)
the Fifth Circuit's adoption of its novel interpretation of the Chaunt
materiality standard. 97 Adding to this confusion are two theories
which have been repeatedly advanced by litigants, and acknowledged
by the courts throughout the century.
The first of these theories initially received governmental support
in 1909 when the Department of Justice issued its Circular Letter
No. 10798 which declared that denaturalization proceedings should
not he sought "to cancel certificates of naturalization alleged to have
been fraudulently or illegally procured unless some substantial results
are to be achieved thereby in the way of betterment of the citizen-
ship of the country." 99  Further,
The [denaturalization statutes] are construed to be remedial
rather than penal in nature; for the protection of the body politic
rather than for the punishment of the individual concerned. Ordi-
narily, nothing less than the betterment of the citizenship of the
country should be regarded as sufficient to justify the disturbance
of personal and property rights which cancellation proceedings may
occasion .... If however, many years have elapsed since the
judgment of naturalization was apparently . .. procured [by fraud],
and the party has since conducted himself as a good citizen and
possesses the necessary qualifications for citizenship, cancellation
proceedings should not, as a rule, be instituted. 100
This policy enunciated by the Department of Justice is justified in
part by the grave consequences implicit in every denaturalization
proceeding. As stated by the Supreme Court in Schneiderman v.
United States,
In its consequences, [denaturalization] is more serious than a tak-
ing of one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty.
For it is safe to assert that nowhere in the world today is the right
of citizenship of greater worth than it is in this country. It would
be difficult to exaggerate its value and importance. By many it is
regarded as the highest hope of civilized men. l 0 '
95. See generally notes 28-32 supra, and accompanying text.
96. See generally notes 33-34 supra, and accompanying text.
97. See generally notes 76-85 supra, and accompanying text.
98. Letter No. 107 from the Dept. of justice Circular, supra note 19.
99. Id.
100. 1d.
101. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
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The severity of an order revoking citizenship has been consistently
emphasized by the courts in this country. 1' 2
Although a failure to follow the published policy did not bar the
bringing of an action against Fedorenko, 10 3 the underlying considera-
tions of the policy are relevant to the outcome of the suit. No doubt,
had this action been brought shortly after Fedorenko's naturalization,
when the fear of infiltration by communists and other political unde-
sirables was so prevalent as to provoke the enactment of section 10 of
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,104 the requisite "protection of the
body politic" would have necessitated the action. Moreover, not only
has the rationale of section ten's enactment diminished in signifi-
cance 105 but also, Fedorenko has conducted himself as a good Ameri-
can citizen for over twenty-nine years.' 0 6 Under Circular Letter No.
107, Fedorenko's conduct for such a length of time would serve to
bar the bringing of the action.
The second theory which has prevailed, despite uncertainty in
immigration law, recognizes the similarity between denaturalization
actions and deportation proceedings. Courts have consistently
analogized denaturalization to deportation because of the severe po-
tential consequences an alien faces in each. The United States Sup-
reme Court on more than one occasion ' 0 7 has stated, "[D]enaturaliza-
tion, like deportation, may result in the loss of all that makes life
worth living." 1 0 s
This analogy has in turn led courts to apply denaturalization
principles to their deportation decisions, 109 and to require the same
102. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944): "[Sluch
gravity ... is implied in an attempt to reduce a person to the status of alien from
that of citizen."; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946): "Denaturaliza-
tion actions involve tremendously high stakes for the individual. [They] may result in
the loss of all that makes life worth living ... the fate of a human being is at stake
..."; Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 296 (1961): "American citizenship is a
precious right. Severe consequences may attend its loss, aggravated when the person
has enjoyed his citizenship for many years."; United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 116
(1963): "The right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one. Once acquired,
the loss of citizenship can have severe and unsettling consequences."
103. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp, 893, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1978) [citing
United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978)].
104. See generally note 24 supra.
105. Gordon and Rosenfield, supra note 24.
106. 455 F.2d at 896.
107. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Knauer v. United States, 328
U.S. 654 (1946).
108. Id., 259 U.S. at 281 and 328 U.S. 659.
109. "'Although Chaunt and Rossi involved denaturalization proceedings, their
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burden of proof from the Government in each. 110 Similarly, any fact
held to be "material" in a denaturalization proceeding may, under
this theory, likewise be "material" in a deportation hearing. There-
fore, in reaching its decision in Fedorenko,111 the Supreme Court
should note that any test it enunciates regarding materiality is likely
to be extended, in future judicial decisions, to deportation proceed-
ings. Thus the Court should take into account the ramifications of its
materiality standard being applied in both denaturalization proceed-
ings and deportation hearings.
In addition to considering the two aforementioned theories in its
upcoming Fedorenko decision, the Supreme Court should recall the
high burden of proof required of the Government in denaturalization
and deportation proceedings. 112 The Government must prove its al-
legations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence x3 which
does not leave the issue "to conjecture" 1 14 or "in doubt."' '  The
test propounded by the Court must accomodate such a standard of
proof, and lower courts must be given guidelines on which to support
their future decisions. This may call for Congress or the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to act to provide courts with such
guidelines.116 Unless the courts are provided with the guidelines
necessary to apply the Supreme Court's test for materiality, confusion
and ambiguity will continue to persist in this area.
IV. CONCLUSION
United States v. Fedorenko 117 provides the United States Su-
premne Court with an opportunity to end twenty years of uncer-
rationale is forceful here, where the severe remedy of deportation is the issue." La
Madrid-Peraza, supra notes 33 and 54.
110. "In denaturalization cases, the court has required the Government to estab-
lish its allegations by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence .... No less a
burden of proof is appropriate in deportation proceedings." 358 U.S. at 286.
111. 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
112. Supra note 9.
113. Id.
114. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 689.
115. United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1964).
116. For example, if the two-phase interpretation of Chaunt is endorsed by the
Court, lower courts must be provided with information as to when an investigation
"'might" have been conducted. Note the concern regarding the proper weight to be
afforded an INS officer's testimony regarding the possibility of an investigation in
United States v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952
(1956); United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 952.
117. 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979).
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tainty. 15 8 By explicitly stating what the definition of a material fact is
under section 1451(a), the Court will permit lower courts to consis-
tently administer justice in this area of United States immigration
law. **
PATRICIA M. HEALY*
118. The first "Question Presented" in the petition for certiorari filed on October
30, 1979 asks, "Does proof of materiality as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) and as
set forth in Chaunt v. U.S ... require that Goverimenit must prove existence of
ultimate facts that would have warranted denial of citizenship and that disclosure of
suppressed or misstated facts might have led to discovery of ultimate facts?" 48
U.S.L.W. 3561 (1979).
*J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law; Articles and Comments
Editor, Lawyer of the Americas.
**On January 21, 1981, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals revoking Fedorenko's citizenship on the grounds that it was
illegally procured in contravention of § 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Fedorenko v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4120 (1981). The Court's reasoning in-
cluded the following considerations: Failure to comply with any of the conditions for
citizenship renders the certificate of citizenship illegally procured and, as such, it can
be set aside. In a denaturalization proceeding the Government carries a heavy bur-
den of proof, and evidence justifying revocation of citizenship must be clear, un-
equivocal, and convincing and not leave the issue in doubt. A visa obtained through a
material misrepresentation is not valid. A misrepresentation must be considered
material if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a
visa, and it would be unnecessary to determine whether the materiality test of
Chaunt as to application for citizenship also applies to false statements in visa applica-
tions. Although a denaturalization action is a suit in equity, it is not within the dis-
cretion of a district court to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization
against a citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresenta-
tion.
